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A Delicate Balance: Limiting 
Consolidation in Agricultural Seed 
Markets Without Stifling Innovation 
Justin Brickey* 
ABSTRACT 
Agricultural seed markets have experienced significant consolidation over the past 
fifty years, apparently driven by private investment in research and development 
(“R&D”) made profitable through extensive intellectual property protections. The 
current intellectual property law regime on plants allows an innovator to obtain a 
wide variety of protections on new plant varieties, whether created through natural 
breeding processes or genetic engineering. Investment has paid off and the United 
States has experienced significant benefits through increased productivity, meaning 
we produce significantly more food today without using more land than our grand-
parents. However, agricultural markets deserve, and are often given, unique consid-
eration because of the importance of the product. Competition in these markets may 
be on the verge of breaking down. This Article explores the background and devel-
opment of Intellectual Property (“IP”) law as it relates to self-replicating technolo-
gies (plants) and speculates on two ways legislators can promote and protect com-
petition without destroying private incentive to innovate: extending research excep-
tions for universities and banning the development and use of Genetic Use Re-
striction Technologies (“GURTs”). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property rights protecting self-replicating technologies (plants) 
have exploded over the last several decades, making it one of the fastest growing 
intellectual property  (“IP”) law areas.1 Debate continues to rage over the appropri-
ate balance between protecting inventors’ rights and promoting diffusion of inno-
vations.2 Supporters of strong IP protection for inventors argue that research and 
development (“R&D”) is prohibitively expensive without some way of guarantee-
ing a return on investment.3 They further argue badly needed innovations, which 
benefit all of society, would never come to fruition without strong protection.4 
Counter-arguments contend non-profit research, performed mostly by NGOs and 
universities, are more than adequate to further society’s needs. Some even go as far 
as arguing there is no empirical support for patent law in general.5 Clear answers in 
this debate require a strong understanding of economics and sufficient data to pre-
dict what would have been absent IP protection over plants, and reasonable experts 
disagree. But what about when the inventors seek to protect their inventions (and 
monopoly profits) by circumventing the legal system entirely? Is it appropriate for 
an inventor, many of whom have benefited greatly from current IP laws, to use their 
R&D to ensure their product only survives a single generation after sale? 
This Article argues the interests IP law seeks to promote are thwarted if inno-
vators can use Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (“GURTs”) to ensure monop-
oly profits. Additionally, in the unique industry of agriculture, which is vital to our 
survival and growth, research should be encouraged in all possible avenues. Re-
search exceptions to patent law infringement for research universities would help 
ensure maximum possible development without jeopardizing private innovation. 
Patent law exists to promote “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”6 Gen-
erally speaking, patent protections represent a trade-off. Society allows otherwise 
undesirable monopolization in exchange for incentivizing investment in innova-
tion.7 Diffusion is an important part of the patent law scheme, meaning after the 
inventor recoups their investment and receives a reasonable profit, society benefits 
from the free exchange of inventions. Obviously, any monopoly power gained 
through innovation and IP law protections is meant to be temporary. 
But what if a firm took the benefits of their temporary monopoly and used those 
profits to develop ways of permanently protecting their inventions through extra-
legal means, such that society may never gain unrestricted use of the invention? 
This type of behavior could result from several different motivators. It may be that 
traditional IP protections are inadequate to incentivize investment in the biotech 
 
* Justin Brickey is law student at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of law. 
1.See Sun Ling Wang et al., U.S. Agricultural Productivity Growth: The Past Challenges and the Future, 
AMBER WAVES (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/september/us-agricul-
tural-productivity-growth-the-past-challenges-and-the-future/. 
 2. Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating 
Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 115, 117 (2007). In this context, the term “consumer” includes 
agricultural producers (farmers) who purchase the patent protected product from the inventor. 
 3. Id. at 129. 
 4. Id. at 120. 
 5. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1 
(2013). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). 
2
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss2/7
No. 2] Brickey : A Delicate Balance 291 
industry since the invention is self-replicating and difficult to control once the first 
sale is complete. Alternatively, biotech firms may be adequately protected by the 
current law and are simply making rational business choices to limit cost in the long 
run and secure profits for the future. 
This Article argues current law adequately protects and incentivizes innovation 
and that Congress should remove the temptation for biotech firms to waste re-
sources developing genetic use restriction technology. Part II contains a brief intro-
duction to GURTs and a survey of IP law as it concerns self-replicating bio-organ-
isms. Part III examines the current state of the biotech market. Part IV examines 
ways to improve the system to promote innovation while also protecting society’s 
interests in competition and diffusion. 
II: UNDERSTANDING GURTS AND THE CURRENT IP PROTECTION 
FRAMEWORK OVER PLANTS 
A. How GURTs work and why they were developed 
Biotechnology firms began developing GURTs as a possible way to protect 
their investment without resorting to patent enforcement.8 Initial development was 
sponsored at least in part by the United States Department of Agriculture.9 GURTs 
come in two basic forms. The first type is Variety GURT, commonly referred to as 
a “terminator gene,” which control plant fertility by allowing the plant to developed 
seeds but then poisoning each embryo after development.10 The second type, known 
as “traitor genes,” are designed to turn a particular trait on or off.11 
News of the terminator gene’s development caused widespread condemnation 
among various scientific and international governmental organization.12 Concerns 
ranged from possible cross-breeding with wild plant populations to negative socio-
economic effects.13 For example, many poor farmers across the globe depend on 
saving seeds from a crop to plant the next season.14 If GURTs were commercialized, 
these farmers would be forced to purchase new seed each year, reducing their al-
ready thin profit-margins.15 
Even some of the harshest critics of terminator genes admit that in some cir-
cumstances GURTs may be useful in preventing otherwise genetically modified 
 
 8. See Luca Lombardo, Genetic Use Restriction Technologies: A Review, 12 PLANT 
BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 995, 995 (2014). 
 9. See Scott Kilman, Monsanto Won’t Commercialize Terminator Gene, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
pg. B4 Oct. 5, 1999; see also Lombardo supra note 8 at 995. 
 10. Lombardo supra note 8 at 995. 
 11. Id. (“T-GURT (ironically known as traitor technology) is designed to switch on or off a trait (such 
as herbicide/cold/drought/stress tolerance, pest resistance, germination, flowering, ripening, color, taste 
and nutritional qualities of the plant, defense mechanisms, or production of industrial or pharmaceutical 
compounds) using inducible promoters regulating the expression of the transgene through induced gene 
silencing(e.g., by antisense suppression) or by excision of the transgene using a recombinase (FAO, 
2001a).”). 
 12. Id. at 996. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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organisms from spreading into the wild and disrupting natural ecosystems.16 Mon-
santo responded to growing popular concerns by announcing a pledge to not com-
mercialize any plants containing the terminator gene.17 Arguments related to pro-
tecting natural wildlife from GMO encroachment aside, a reasonable question 
arises: if this is the kind of less-than-beneficial-to-society R&D large biotechnology 
firms are investing resources to develop, how should we react? On the one hand, 
there is something perverse about a firm that has benefited under the current IP law 
regime by obtaining a large market share to use their resources in a way which 
benefits no one but their shareholders.18 On the other hand, IP law enforcement is 
expensive and perhaps impossible in some developing countries that do not have an 
effective enforcement mechanism.19 In typical markets, societal benefits may not 
be a significant concern. Agricultural markets are different, since they produce a 
basic human necessity.  It is necessary to understand the general background of IP 
law as it relates to plants in order to understand why some, including the USDA, 
believed GURTs were a necessary and worthwhile development. 
B. Intellectual Property Rights in the United States for self-
replicating biological organisms 
For most of United States history, living microorganisms were beyond patent 
protection.20 Beginning in the 1930s, Congress recognized that innovators should 
receive just reward for their efforts, and therefore enacted a series of legislation 
providing various forms of Intellectual Property Rights (“IPR”) for plants.21 Today, 
there are three basic methods for obtaining IPR for innovation in plant technology, 
each with varying degrees of protection and application costs. 
First, Congress passed the Plant Protection Act of 1930 (“PPA”), which allows 
inventors to new patent varieties developed through cross-breeding.22 The patent 
holder is able to prevent others from asexually reproducing the protected plant and 
from using or selling the plant or its parts.23 Asexual reproduction includes growing 
a plant from cuttings, budding, and grafting two different plants together.24 The de-
scription requirements are less stringent under the PPA then in a typical patent 
 
 16. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of the Panel of Eminent Experts 
on Ethics in Food and Agriculture, Risks, Uncertainties and Doubts in the use of GMOs, (2001) 
http://www.fao.org/3/x9600e/x9600e06.htm#P12_3335; see also Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000–01. 
 17. Kilman, supra note 9. At the time Monsanto made the promise, it did not own the terminator gene 
patent but had announced merger plans with Delta & Pine Land who had developed the gene in conjunc-
tion with the USDA. Id. 
 18. See infra, Section III. 
 19. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000–01. 
 20. See Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 
777 (1992); Funk Bros. Seeds Co. v. KaloInoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (holding that a combination 
of biological organisms was not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. §§161–164 (1998).35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164. 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and 
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than 
a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject 
to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2018). 
 24. Timothy P. Daniels, Keep the License Agreements Coming: The Effects of J.E.M Ag Supply, In-
corporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorporated on Universities’ Use of Intellectual Property 
Laws to Protect Their Plant Genetic Research, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 771, 775 (2003). 
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application under 35 U.S.C. § 101.25 Applications under the PPA are less expensive 
than those under a utility patent, but PPA only protects a narrow type of innovation 
with limited commercial use.26 The PPA contains no enumerated research excep-
tion, which may be understandable considering the time period in which it was en-
acted.27 
Adding an additional method for protecting plant innovation, Congress enacted 
the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970 (“PVPA”).28 The PVPA allows a breeder 
of a sexually reproduced, tuber propagated, or asexually reproduced plant variety 
to obtain protection for a unique plant variety.29 Various parts of the PVPA evidence 
Congressional concern for society’s unique interest in agriculture.30 A major dis-
tinction from the PPA is the PVPA’s research exception.31 Plants protected under 
the PVPA are still usable without infringement by virtually anyone conducting re-
search. Farmers are also permitted to save seeds from PVPA protected plants so 
long as they purchased the seed originally in a bona fide sale for a purpose other 
than reproduction.32 Anyone can use protected varieties in cross breeding so long 
as they are not later marketing a derivative product.33 Reading these provisions as a 
whole gives the distinct impression that Congress is deeply concerned with both 
innovating plant development and protecting the downstream consumer, including, 
in the case of food crops, the farmer and the consumer who ultimately eats the prod-
uct. 
Lastly, biotech inventors may also apply for a utility patent under 35 U.S.C. § 
101.34 These protections are the most stringent available, lasting 20 years, and the 
most expensive and difficult to obtain.35 Protections for plants under § 101 have 
only recently been allowed. For almost 200 years, living matter was thought to be 
unpatentable.36 However, that changed in 1980 with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the Court held genetically engineered organisms 
were patentable under § 101.37 The Court’s holding hinged on the distinction be-
tween human-made organism and those occurring naturally.38 Where the inventor 
has created something through research that does not occur in nature, it may be 
patentable under § 101 even though it is a living organism. The Court considered 
the argument that by enacting the PPA and PVPA, Congress had expressed its intent 
 
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2018) (“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for 
noncompliance with section 112 if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.”). 
 26. See Savich, supra note 2. 
 27. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164. 
 28. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018). 
 29. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2018). 
 30. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2018) (reserving the right for the Secretary of the Plant Variety Protection Office 
to allow open use of a protected variety “in order to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in 
this country [where] [] the owner is unwilling or unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a 
price which may reasonably be deemed fair.”). 
 31. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2018). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(1-4) (2018). 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 35. See generally Ko, supra note 20 
 36. See generally Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1989). 
 37. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 318; Ko, supra note 20 at 777. 
 38. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 313 (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not 
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-
made inventions. Here, respondent’s micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research.”) 
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to exclude living organisms from § 101 protection.39 Ultimately, the Court was jus-
tifiably unpersuaded by this argument.40 
The PPA was most likely enacted for just the opposite reason as exclusion: it 
was passed to include plant innovators in the IPR scheme. As the Court points out, 
Congress most likely enacted the PPA as a way to circumvent the restrictions plant 
innovators faced when applying for a patent under § 101.41 First, products of nature 
were generally considered beyond the scope of patent protections, meaning all plant 
innovations were technically unpatentable.42 Second, plant innovators could not 
meet the strict written description requirements of § 101.43 The PPA and, to a lesser 
extent, the PVPA were designed to reward and incentivize innovators, not make a 
policy statement that Congress intended to keep plants outside traditional IPR pro-
tection.44 
In all fairness, some PVPA provisions seem to indicate Congress was willing 
to limit IP rights in plants for several reasons.45 As discussed below, the Court 
would have another opportunity to consider a slight variation of the same argu-
ment.46 The key takeaway from the Court’s decision Chakrabarty is that a wide 
array of human-made biological organisms, including plants, are patentable under 
§ 101.47 To qualify for a utility patent, a plant innovator “must show that he has 
developed a new, useful, and non-obvious” plant, meet the written description re-
quirements of § 112, and deposit a sample of seed that is available to the public.48 
A “trade secret” is a form of intellectual property law that can protect a devel-
oper’s methodology.49 Trade secret law combined with hybrid plant development 
can help protect a plant breeder’s innovations. However, they are important for hy-
brid varieties which cannot self-pollinate,50 where commercialized seeds ensure hy-
brid vigor only for the first generation of plants.51 The valuable information is in 
the parent lines, which typically are not commercialized.52 Subsequent generations 
are significantly less productive, creating an incentive to buy new seed each 
 
 39. Id. at 310–315. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 310–312. 
 42. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–312 (1980). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Savich, supra note 2 (discussing economic theories behind IPR in the plant research context). 
 45. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164; see also Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§2321-2582. 
 46. See infra pp. 9–13 
 47. See also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (unanimous 
decision confirming that naturally occurring DNA, despite the difficulty of identifying it, is unpatentable 
but DNA that has been modified through human intervention is patentable). 
 48. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001) (citing 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–103, 112, and 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801–1.809). 
 49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
“[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, eco-
nomic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, 
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible 
or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graph-
ically, photographically, or in writing if-- 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain 
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.” 
 50. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000. 
 51. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1233–35 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 52. See Id. at 1226–1246. 
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season.53 Pioneer v. Holden demonstrated that the law of trade secrets is another 
method for protecting investment in plant innovation by holding the defendant lia-
ble for violating Pioneer’s trade secrets in its popular corn line.54 Hybrids essentially 
operate as a ‘natural’ IP protection.55 
C. Additional case law development post-Chakrabarty 
A variation of the argument raised in Chakrabarty was litigated again in J.E.M. 
Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer.56 Pioneer brought a patent infringement claim against 
J.E.M. for violating the licensing agreement contained on its bags of hybrid corn.57 
J.E.M. countered with a general denial and an affirmative defense of patent invalid-
ity, arguing that sexually reproducing plants are not patentable under § 101 and that 
the PPA and PVPA, as the more specific statutes, are meant to be the exclusive 
means of protecting plants.58 Specific to the PPA, J.E.M. argued Congress consid-
ered plants beyond the scope of § 101 when it specifically limited the PPA to asex-
ually reproduced plants, because if they thought plants were patentable under § 101 
there would be no reason for additional protections.59 The Court began by reiterat-
ing its holding in Chakrabarty, first noting the critical distinction between what is 
patentable versus unpatentable is not its status as living or inanimate, but rather 
whether it has been altered by humans into something that does not occur in na-
ture.60 Second, the Court held that the PPA is restricted to asexually reproduced 
plants because Congress could not have anticipated that plant science would even-
tually allow plant breeders to produce stable characteristics through sexual repro-
duction.61 In other words, the Court contends that Congress did not think it was 
necessary to protect sexually reproduced plants since they thought no useful varie-
ties could be produced that way.62 Finally, the Court pointed out that until 1924, 
most farmers received free seed from the government.63 This means commercial 
interests were drastically different than they are now, since producers in the fledg-
ling seed market were primarily concerned with commoditizing seed in general. 
The Court was simply unwilling to make any negative inferences from Congress’s 
intent behind the PPA. 
J.E.M.’s argument stemming from the PVPA was more compelling (although 
equally unsuccessful). The PVPA granted specific, limited patent-like protection 
for sexually reproduced plants. As discussed above, several provisions of the PVPA 
seem to indicate Congress’s intent to limit IPR protections, especially where food 
crops are concerned.64 The Court was unpersuaded, finding it easy to reconcile the 
 
 53. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000. 
 54. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 35 F.3d at 1243. 
 55. The word ‘natural’ here is meant to denote normal plant reproductive processes. It is not meant to 
imply that hybrids developed through selective breeding would necessarily occur in nature. 
 56. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145-146 (2001). 
 57. Id. at 128-29. 
 58. Id. at 129. 
 59. Id. at 132. 
 60. Id. at 134. 
 61. Id. at 135. 
 62. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 136 (2001) (citing E. Sinnott, 
Botany Principles and Problems 266-267 (1935) & J. Priestley & L. Scott, Introduction to Botany 530 
(1938)). 
 63. Id. at 136. 
 64. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018); 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2018). 
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PVPA and § 101 since: (1) the PVPA contains no express exclusionary language 
and (2) it is harder to qualify for a patent under § 101 than with a PVP certificate, 
therefore “it only makes sense that utility patents would confer a greater scope of 
protection.”65 In essence, the Court found that the PVPA’s limited scope and spe-
cific provisions for protecting societal interests weigh against finding Congres-
sional intent to otherwise exclude sexually reproduced plants from § 101. The Court 
found other reasons to hold the two provisions can co-exist, namely that utility pa-
tents require greater disclosure and repository of physical material accessible to the 
public, while PVP certificates do not.66 Additionally, the Court is bound by prece-
dent which prevents it from invalidating two statutes that are capable of co-existing 
without resulting in inconsistent outcomes.67 
In dissent, Justice Breyer wrote that he would have decided along the lines ar-
gued by J.E.M., that Congress intended IPR in living plants to be regulated by the 
two more specific statutes.68 Ultimately, IP rights in living plants are now well es-
tablished within United States jurisprudence. Statistics show productivity in the ag-
ricultural industry has steadily increased over the last fifty years without a corre-
sponding increase in farmed land.69 For example, soybean yields per acre have dou-
bled since 1948 and corn yields have quadrupled.70 A significant reason for the in-
creased productivity is R&D, much of which, as discussed above, is capable of be-
ing protected under IP law.71 Private sector R&D has grown by over one-third since 
the 1980s,72 possibly as a reaction to Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty which, as discussed above, held living organisms could be protected 
under a utility patent so long as they were human-made and not naturally occur-
ring.73 Shortly after the Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, held in Ex Parte 
Hibberd that plant life was patentable under § 101.74 With all three federal branches 
in agreement, investors after 1985 could be confident that any new and useful inno-
vation would bring monopoly profits, thereby justifying risky R&D investment. 
D. Enforcement Costs 
Gaining a patent and marketing a successful product is only one part of profit-
ing from patent protected innovation. Patent protection can only be effective if con-
sumers believe patent holders will take action to enforce their rights, especially for 
a self-replicating technology like a plant. Seed producers like Monsanto have 
 
 65. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., at 138. 
 66. Id. at 142-44. 
 67. Id. at 143-44 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551(1976) (“when two statutes are capable 
of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the con-
trary, to regard each as effective”)). 
 68. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 69. ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADMIN. PUB. NO. 083, AG AND FOOD STATISTICS: 
CHARTING THE ESSENTIALS, FEBRUARY 2020 11-12 (2020). 
 70. Wang et al. supra note 1. 
 71. See Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
 74. Hibberd, et al., 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (The examiner, who had denied various 
applications related to maize, unsuccessfully defended its decision in part by arguing the PPA of 1930 
and the PVPA of 1970 evidenced Congressional intent to exclude plant life from patentability under § 
101.) 
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engaged in vigorous enforcement actions, spending significant sums investigating 
and prosecuting IP infringements.75 By 2012, Monsanto had filed over 140 lawsuits 
and collected more than $23 million in judgements.76 Importantly, the Supreme 
Court has held the first sale doctrine, first articulated in Adams v. Burke,77 does not 
apply to patent protected seeds.78 The Court’s unanimous decision in Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co. held that farmers who save patent protected seed for replanting in a 
subsequent season cannot use the first sale doctrine as a defense against a patent 
infringement suit.79 Typically, a patentee losses all ability to restrict use of an item 
after the first authorized sale.80 Bowman argued that by saving the seed he was 
simply using the items as farmers had always done.81 The Court rejected his argu-
ment, finding that by using seed saved from one season to plant in a later season, 
Bowman was actually replicating patented technology without a license to do so.82 
The Court’s decision sent a clear message: farmers who violate license agreements 
on patented plants do so at their own peril. 
With the law definitively settled, agricultural innovators can be confident that 
enforcement endeavors will be effective at preventing infringement. Of course, in-
vestigating violations is difficult and expensive. Farmers are certainly not going to 
advertise violations. However, Monsanto clearly demonstrated biotech firms can 
investigate and successfully prosecute violators.83 Given their significant market 
power, major seed producers are in a good position to pass on any enforcement costs 
to the consumers.84 
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE AGRICULTURAL BIOTECH INDUSTRY: 
MOVING TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 
Over the last 50 years, the private agricultural industry has experienced signif-
icant consolidation and the effects are easily demonstrated by the controversy sur-
rounding the merger of Bayer and Monsanto.85 On May 29, 2018, the Antitrust Di-
vision of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the merger of the two 
biotech giants under § 7 of the Clayton Act.86 The DOJ was concerned that the 
merger would substantially eliminate competition in several important agricultural 
markets.87 Monsanto and Bayer represented two sides of the same coin that is mod-
ern agricultural business: they both developed and sold ‘systems’ designed to 
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increase productivity through combining chemicals and genetically modified plant 
varieties and were virtually the only competitors in certain markets.88 Specifically, 
the DOJ alleged the merger would all but eliminate competition in the markets for 
three U.S. crops: cotton, canola, and soybeans.89 Herbicide and pesticide develop-
ment has become intertwined with genetically modified plant varieties, which are 
engineered to withstand high exposure levels, and the two companies were the only 
major competitors in many markets.90 For example, Monsanto’s “Roundup Ready” 
soybeans were engineered for use alongside their herbicide (Roundup), greatly in-
creasing the soybeans’ resistance to the herbicide. The DOJ argued Bayer produced 
the only competitive alternative to Monsanto’s weed-control systems.91 
The merger was allowed to proceed only after Bayer agreed to divest $9 billion 
in assets to BASF (Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik), making it one of the largest 
divestment agreements in United States history.92 The divestment included all of 
Bayer’s businesses in the canola, cotton, soybean, and vegetable seed markets.93 
The important thing to take away from this merger is the insight it provides into the 
current market concentration in several key agricultural industries. Pre-merger, 
Bayer and Monsanto had a combined market share of approximately 59% of genet-
ically modified cotton seeds sold in the United States, 94 74% market share of ge-
netically modified canola seeds,95 and a significant portion of soybean seeds.96 
Monsanto’s only competitors in the soybean market either relied on licenses for 
Roundup Ready traits or used post-patent versions of the original Roundup Ready 
trait.97 This case demonstrated that many agricultural seed markets in the United 
States are highly concentrated and dominated by private mega-firms like Bayer and 
BASF, who have profited from extensive investment in R&D. These innovations 
are typically patent protected and have revolutionized American food production.98 
Patents are designed to reward innovation by allowing an inventor of a useful 
new product to collect monopoly profits for a limited time.99 Patent law reflects a 
theoretical bargain between the inventor and society. The inventor is allowed a 
time-limited monopoly and society is rewarded with unrestricted use of the inven-
tion after the period ends.100 There is a delicate balance, however, between stimu-
lating innovation and preventing societal harms resulting from failed market com-
petition.101 Evaluating the effects of patent protections on competition in the 
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agricultural industry, which includes many distinct markets, is beyond the scope of 
this Article. There is ongoing debate as to whether the current plant-related IP 
scheme is beneficial to society, i.e., whether the current protections strike the ap-
propriate balance between stimulating innovation while maintaining efficient mar-
ket competition.102 If we assume the theoretical premise behind patent law is true 
and patent protections stimulate innovation by offering monopoly profit rewards, 
then the increased productivity in United States agriculture following private in-
vestment in agricultural R&D is probably the result of modern IP law developments. 
It is also clear that several key agricultural markets have experienced significant 
consolidation.103 
With key agricultural markets dominated by a few large international firms, 
incentives to innovate provided by patent protections are probably less important. 
The firms must continue to innovate or risk losing their market position. R&D costs 
necessary to develop competitive plant traits represent a significant barrier to entry 
into markets dominated by genetically modified seeds.104 It may be time to re-ex-
amine the actual balance in the agricultural industry between innovators’ need for 
monopoly profits and society’s benefit in subsequent use of the invention. Regard-
less of whether the current regime is a net positive for society, there is no need to 
allow continued development of systems designed to ensure perpetual monopolies. 
Additionally, industry giants are unlikely to face a credible threat from research 
universities, but society stands to gain significant benefits from a robust research 
exception to patent infringement. These ideas are more fully explored in the next 
section. 
IV. SOLUTIONS: PROTECTING RESEARCH EXCEPTIONS AND 
RESTRICTING GENETIC USE RESTRICTION TECHNOLOGIES 
A. Expanding research exceptions for universities 
Experimental use is a defense against a patent infringement claim.105 This de-
fense arises from the same interests underpinning the experimental use doctrine, 
which allows an inventor to test their invention publicly before filing for a patent.106 
Under the experimental use defense, a potential infringer must show they used the 
patented invention “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philo-
sophical inquiry.”107 Research universities operated for some time under the belief 
that they could not be held liable for patent infringement so long as they limited 
 
 102. Compare Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 1 (2013), with Jacob Moscona, Flowers of Invention: Patent Protection and Productivity 
Growth in US Agriculture, (July 27, 2020) (on file with the Department of Economics, M.I.T.). 
 103. See generally Complaint, United States v. Bayer AG and Monsanto Co., No. 1:18-cv-01241, 2018 
WL 2417887 (D.D.C. May 29, 2018). 
 104. See generally Moscona, supra note 102. 
 105. Kostolansky, supra note 100 at 36. 
 106. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) (establishing the ex-
perimental use exception to the public use bar to patent protection); see also Kostolansky, supra note 
100 at 33-36. 
 107. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Roche Products, 
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (suspended by statute related to develop-
ment of pharmaceuticals)). 
11
Brickey: A Delicate Balance: Limiting Consolidation in Agricultural Seed M
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
300 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 4 2020 
their use of patented inventions to furthering their research endeavors.108 But the 
Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke drastically limited the scope of the exception as 
applied to private research universities.109 The court held the research exception 
does not shield universities from liability when “the act is in furtherance of the al-
leged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry…”110 The holding affects private in-
stitutions disproportionately to public ones since sovereign immunity insulates pub-
lic research universities from suit.111 
The court’s holding attempts to correct an apparent imbalance in the way the 
research exception had been applied. Universities, both public and private, were 
able to use patent protections to profit from innovation but were essentially immune 
to liability.112 Far from using patented inventions for purely philosophical inquiry, 
institutions were able to earn substantial profits enforcing their patent rights.113 
Blanket research exceptions may run contrary to IP law’s theoretical underpin-
nings, but society’s interests in agricultural development are better served by the 
pre-Madey research exception. Agricultural innovators are not competing to de-
velop ‘a better mouse-trap,’ or build the next iPhone. Instead, the results of their 
innovations may increase access to a basic human necessity. A statutory repeal of 
Madey, with some additional tailoring, would leave intact traditional patent incen-
tives for private innovators while simultaneously increasing overall development 
and possibly introducing some healthy competition into concentrated markets. Ad-
ditionally, university researchers (and offices of general counsel) would conserve 
significant resources now used to investigate potential patent violations in agricul-
tural research projects. 
B. Prohibition of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies 
Governments around the world reacted with great suspicion when GURTs first 
gained notoriety.114 Following recommendations from the United Nations Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, countries like Canada and India prohibited field testing 
and commercialization of GURTs.115 Public concern centered on the unknown and 
potentially negative environmental impacts of GURTs.116 In support of GURTs, 
some scholars have speculated they could be used to stop genetically modified 
plants from contaminating wild ecosystems.117 However, if a genetically modified 
plant is potentially so dangerous that rendering it infertile is necessary to stop it 
from spreading, then perhaps we should consider whether such a plant should be 
used at all. Leaving aside unknown environmental impacts, there is an economic 
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reason to prohibit GURTs. They can be used to guarantee monopoly profits on new 
genetic traits indefinitely. 
Agricultural seed and chemical developers could use GURTs to circumvent 
costly patent applications and enforcement litigation. For example, if a company 
developed a new herbicide-ready soybean variety and equipped it with a GURT 
which prevents farmers (or anyone else) from saving seed from the first planting, 
they could forgo patenting the product since it would be impossible for anyone to 
replicate it through normal reproduction. A GURT-equipped seed would not need 
to be patented since it would be impossible to save seeds from one crop to plant the 
next season.118 Nothing could compel the company to enter their new variety into 
the public domain and there would be no time limit on their new monopoly. GURTs 
provide no obvious benefit to society, yet the risks to the environment and market 
competition is clear.119 Since the developer of a GURT-equipped seed would not 
have to worry about patenting their product to ensure monopoly profits, they would 
never need to disclose their innovation to the public, meaning generic versions 
would be difficult or impossible to develop. Public outcry originally kept GURTs 
from being commercialized.120 Public sentiment, however, is a fickle thing. If fear 
of GURTs ever dissipates, there is nothing to prevent agri-business giants from tak-
ing advantage of them, circumventing the IP scheme altogether and potentially de-
creasing competition in an already highly concentrated area. 
One reasonable economic argument in support of GURTs is that companies 
will save money on IP enforcement actions, which may lead to lower prices. How-
ever, this would only happen if the GURT users were operating in a competitive 
market. As we have seen, many seed markets are not highly competitive and there 
is thus no reason to expect a market participant to lower prices after obtaining an 
indefinite monopoly on a new innovation. 
Detractors may further argue that a company able to develop a product incapa-
ble of being replicated by its competitors is entitled to whatever benefits result, even 
a de facto monopoly. For-profit corporations, after all, have an obligation to their 
shareholders to pursue profit-seeking behavior.121 There may come a time when 
public sentiment against GURTs wanes to the point where it would be profitable 
for a developer to implement them in a commercial line. We should not rely on seed 
producers to voluntarily exclude GURTs from their products forever.122 
A few uncertain benefits do not outweigh the potentially enormous cost to com-
petition. Since the potential harm is great and any benefits are small and speculative, 
Congress should utilize its broad power under the commerce clause to ban GURT-
equipped organisms from being sold in in the United States.123 Congress could de-
termine a ban on GURTs is rationally related to protecting market competition, the 
environment, and society’s interest in maintaining affordable food products. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Agricultural innovations continue to increase productivity in the United States. 
Patent protections for crop plants are firmly established in our jurisprudence and 
provide ample protection to innovators, incentivizing private investment in R&D 
through the promise of limited monopoly profits. However, the numerous agricul-
tural seed markets have become highly concentrated, diminishing competition and 
threatening to reduce incentives to innovate. Therefore, our government should 
carefully scrutinize current market conditions to ensure society’s interests are not 
being unduly subjugated to corporate profits. Two ways of safeguarding society’s 
interests are increasing research exceptions available to all research institutions and 
eliminating GURTs as a method of circumventing IP law.124 
 
 124. See e.g. Kilman, supra note 9; Lombardo, supra note 8; Ko, supra note 20. 
 
14
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss2/7
